Once the assault troops dismount, it must deliberately clear through the target positions with grenades. In an ideal scenario, this is conducted with vehicles in intimate support, so that if heavy resistance is countered, the vehicles can suppress the enemy with 30-mm cannon and kill the enemy in place.
Phase 7: Consolidate
The operation is not finished once attacking forces have captured the position; the attacking forces must consolidate. First, they recover their assault troops and replace them with fresh infantry. These troops should avoid occupying the existing positions and instead dig new ones. Equipment and materials for erecting positions with overhead cover can be delivered to the units by UAVs and UGVs. UGVs are disproportionately used for resupply in Ukraine. The attacking force can then transition to screening the approaches to the contested zone with direct fire, moving up defensive infrastructure and UAVs. Initially, the mines laid during the isolation phase can act as a defensive barrier against counterattack. The force can then plan to contest the next sector.
Not all Ukrainian units have the training or resources to carry out operations in the manner described above. The results for the units able to apply this methodology, however, speak for themselves. Ukrainian officers assess that successful attacks using these methods produce an approximate 5% loss rate in favourable terrain, and a 10% loss rate in unfavourable terrain – compared with up to a 50% loss rate for unsuccessful assaults where these methods are not applied. Because these operations can be halted at any phase if conditions are unfavourable, they rarely see a high rate of casualties.
The Relative Merits of Ukraine’s Arms
Having discussed the concept of operation for combined arms manoeuvre as it is emerging in Ukraine, this section covers the merits, contributions and limitations of the various weapons systems within Ukraine’s arsenal. Although some of these systems are held at the brigade echelon, they are generally all made available for battalion and even company operations and used in combination.
ISR and Enablement UAVs
The single most transformative element of warfare in Ukraine remains the ability to maintain observation of the battlefield at all echelons, with feeds fused and analysed across the force. ISR UAVs vary considerably in form, range and robustness. Access to real-time information on enemy positions and movement is not only a key enabler of fires, but also critical for planning manoeuvre. Forces must assume that they will consistently lose ISR UAVs in moderate numbers to interception, and that while more expensive platforms can keep flying in adverse weather, endurance will decline significantly in strong wind. Between weather conditions and deliberate interception, it is possible to create localised gaps in adversary ISR coverage. ISR UAVs can also act as communications relays and laser designators for precision munitions.
ISR UAV teams, however, expose themselves and their equipment in the electromagnetic spectrum, and are targets. Their equipment weighs up to 1.5 tonnes,
which means they cannot redeploy quickly. The placement of ISR assets relative to air defences and protective systems is therefore an important planning consideration.
Howitzers and Mortars
- Artillery pieces remain fundamental to Ukrainian operations. Howitzers and mortars have several advantages over UAVs for conducting strikes:
- Their engagements have a low latency between fire and effect.
- The kinetic energy and explosive payload they deliver increases the damage inflicted.
- A single system can fire multiple ammunition natures to deliver different effects. Howitzers can suppress enemy infantry with cluster munitions, destroy enemy fighting positions with high explosives, fire sensor-fuzed munitions to knock out moving vehicles or use laser-guided munitions to eliminate point targets.
- Howitzers and mortars do not lose their effectiveness in bad weather and can be brought into action when heavy EW is reducing the efficiency of UAVs.
However, the use of howitzers and mortars has changed markedly owing to the threat from UAVs. They are now almost always operated from closed positions – dug into the ground in tree lines – with mesh screens surrounding the pieces, which are then opened when the system moves forward to fire. Artillery pieces operate independently, rather than in batteries. In addition, fire missions are very rarely more than 10 rounds to complete the fire mission before the piece comes under observation. Before going into action, artillery crews check whether they are under observation from UAVs and only fire if not under observation – unless ordered to do so. Ammunition is stored away from the weapon,
and resupply is generally done by UGV. Repositioning of guns is carried out periodically or when there is an indication that the firing position has been identified by the enemy and must be covered by other operations.
It should be noted that with these precautions, artillery and mortars can be highly survivable. Ukrainian analysts assess that the number of Russian artillery pieces destroyed in Ukrainian UAV strikes is approximately 50% of what is publicly claimed, as many hits against artillery pieces damage rather than destroy their targets and the artillery is subsequently recovered and repaired.
EW
EW is an integral part of all operations in Ukraine. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is the most reliable passive means of tracking enemy positions, activity and the presence of UAVs. When augmented with distributed acoustic sensors, units can maintain reliable early warning as to the presence of UAVs. The interception of video feeds from enemy UAVs also allows for the coordination of countermeasures, because it reveals what the enemy is targeting. ELINT also enables the prioritisation of what is investigated by stand-in ISR.
EW is equally critical to the protection of platforms and forces during manoeuvre. Navigational jamming is a crucial means of degrading enemy precision strikes. Jamming control frequencies and communications channels is also vital for the survivability of the force while manoeuvring. However, jamming simultaneously degrades the efficiency of friendly systems, and must be synchronised with other arms. When forces do not synchronise, fratricide is inevitable and can cause operations to fail. Deconfliction is often necessary even down to platoon level. A platoon of vehicles, for example, may have fitted electronic countermeasures that must be deconflicted from their own communications and those of the units they are supporting.
EW has largely moved away from using large, dedicated platforms to using distributed antennas and power units. Systems are now modular, can have components quickly replaced, and can be rigged to draw power from generators, vehicles or the grid.
Bomber UAVs
Bomber UAVs are one of the deadliest tools in Ukraine’s arsenal, but also have a wider utility as logistics and engineering assets. Usually operating at night, due to their vulnerability to direct fire, these platforms are used to drop heavier munitions than FPVs can deliver. Bomber UAVs (shown in Figure 4 overlying the author) are highly precise at engaging point targets. They are also used to lay mines, deploy communications relays and deliver ammunition to assault troops, food, water and other consumables like fuel and batteries to fighting positions, and medical supplies to casualties.